Chancellorsville – Stephen Sears

Chancellorsville is my first book by Stephen Sears. It is thick in content and thorough in the extreme. I can tell you right now that it will not be my last of this author.

Sears begins by providing the context of the fateful battle. He discusses the previous failure of the Army of the Potomac under Ambrose Burnside five months earlier at Fredericksburg: the unimaginative hurling of men before superior Confederate positions and the slaughter that ensued.

In comes Joseph Hooker, a general I had previously thought of as brash and foolhardy—just another name to add to the pantheon of incompetent Union generals. Sears, however, makes the case that Hooker’s failures in the Chancellorsville campaign were less due to him directly (as was the case with his predecessors)—and more due to the failures of those immediately beneath his command, as well as some plain bad luck.

It is difficult to imagine a more difficult job than Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac at the start of 1863. Fighting Joe Hooker, arrogant though he was, gave immediate indications that he was indeed the man for the job. He re-organized his army following the Burnside's debacle, administering discipline with strictness. He fixed the problem of Union defectors. He created a new Intelligence branch which worked with surprising success utilizing spies, interrogation tactics, and balloons. Furthermore, Joseph Hooker was a good strategist and he was able to cross the Rappahannock battle line up river and dislodge Lee from his Fredericksburg defenses. He had learned from Burnside’s disaster: this time the Union will have the advantage of the defensive position. Immediately following this maneuver, Robert E. Lee was bleak as ever thus far in the war, writing Jefferson Davis: “Our scattered condition favors their operations.”

But military organization and opening maneuvers are not sufficient in themselves to win battles. Perhaps the biggest take away for me from this book is great leaders are only great if those beneath them execute the plan as communicated. No amount of genius can compensate for blunders within the immediate command. There are notably three Union generals who shared massive responsibility in the outcome of Chancellorsville: George Stoneman, Otis Howard, and John Sedgwick. Each had key roles in the battle, and each failed colossally to achieve their objectives.

The entire campaign hinged on George Stoneman and his massive Cavalry division (10,000 raiders) to ford the Rappahannock and ride deep behind Confederate lines, cutting supply and communication from Richmond. Stoneman had a superior force to anything the Confederates could match, but he dallied and dillied, and day after day the supplies continued to victual the Confederate troops. Had the Union raid sufficiently cut the RF & P line, Lee would have no choice than to turn South and block the Union advance to Richmond. Of the Stoneman appointment Hooker would ruefully say, “You cannot know men for War until you have had an opportunity to try them.”

Otis Howard, general of the 12^th corps on the Union extreme right, held the most precarious position on the Union line. His flank was “in the air”, meaning it was not anchored by river or topographical feature; it was fully exposed to opportunistic and aggressive Southern generals. Sears suspects that Hooker should have retained more cavalry with the main army for the purpose of monitoring enemy movement beyond this exposed flank. Even so, Howard had direct orders to ensure he was ready for attack and took no additional defensive measures. Jackson’s famous march led him “almost” undetected at Howard’s right—and the entire 12^th corps was rolled up in textbook fashion.

Even still, despite Stoneman and Howard’s failures, Hooker was still optimistic for victory. His main body was anchored in defensive positioning and John Sedgwick and his 6^th corps was still across Fredericksburg. Confederate miscommunication actually evacuated the Fredericksburg line, giving Sedgwick a golden opportunity to seize the position and pressure Lee from behind. An aggressive move from this position would likely have broken Lee’s vice-grip of Chancellorsville and taken the field. Sedgwick however was cautious in the spirit of George McClellan and refused to exercise his discretionary orders to attack. When he finally moved, it was too little too late.

To compound this poor generalship, Joseph Hooker himself received a serious concussion from an exploding beam which rendered him senseless for much of Sunday’s most serious fighting. Had he been mentally functioning in this critical moment, Sears speculates that he might have sent in Meade and Reynolds to counter Stuart’s exposed left. There are many “what ifs” from the Union perspective; hind sight is indeed 20-20.

On the other side, it seems fortune indeed favors the bold—especially in a war where timely communication over distance was so unreliable. Instead of insisting on fighting a defensive battle (which has its distinct tactical advantages), Lee did what he had to do, attacking a sufficiently dug in opponent with a smaller force. He employed Jackson brilliantly, and here we see the importance of unity in mind within the command. Lee and Jackson were of one accord, and Jackson utilized the knowledge of locals to find a hidden path that would lead to Hooker's right. That maneuver, combined with the charge that ensued is looked upon by many historians as Jackson’s greatest moment. The Confederates kept pressing the following day, charging and counter charging in a concentrated and bloody affair. Archer's seizing of the Hazel Grove proved pivotal for artillery support throughout that following day.

When reading about Chancellorsville in Gwyne’s Rebel Yell and McPherson’s Battle Cry For Freedom I seem to recall this battle being due to Jackson’s daring flank march, his magnum opus the day before his death. Sears makes the case that if the outcome was due to Southern brilliance, it was equally due to the failures of the Northern command—and some added bad luck.

Still the Southern victory was a gloomy one. They had lost their beloved Stonewall Jackson. Man for man the battle itself was just about as costly for the South as it was the North, and Lee saw army positions settle into their locations prior to the battle. What was gained by all this loss of life? Perhaps not much. In a month, Lee would reassume the initiative northward, looking for a demoralizing Southern victory: Gettysburg.